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 Local capitalism and neoliberalization 
in a Shenzhen former lineage village
Anne-Christine Trémon
Abstract: Th is article examines the process of neoliberalization in the Shenzhen 
special economic zone in Guangdong Province, China. Building on the case study 
of a former peasant and almost single-lineage village that has become a part of 
the city of Shenzhen, I show how neoliberal principles aimed at advancing the 
transition to capitalism are combined with and countered by other ethical tradi-
tions. Owing to the long-standing conception of the lineage as an enterprise, the 
maintenance of the lineage structure in the transformation of the rural collectives 
has off ered fertile ground for the emergence of a local capitalist coalition. Yet the 
current discourses on the necessity of obliterating the remains of the collective 
economy and introducing individual ownership run counter to the collectivist 
values of the lineage village community and the embeddedness of its economy 
in kinship and territorial ties. I further illustrate this discordance by the way in 
which the villagers managed to save their founding ancestor’s grave site following 
government requests to clear the land by removing tombs. Th ese policies form a 
complex blend of state interventions in the economy, neoliberal governance, and 
Confucian principles.
Keywords: capitalism, China, collectives, enterprise, lineage, neoliberalism, Shen-
zhen, shareholding companies
At the onset of the Chinese gaige kaifang (re-
form and opening), several special economic 
zones were designated to experiment with cap-
italism and develop an export economy. Shen-
zhen, whose creation was announced in 1979, 
was the fi rst and most ambitious of all fi ve (Ng 
2003; O’Donnell 2001). Shenzhen was the fi rst 
city in China to grant permission to entrepre-
neurs to start up businesses, open up to foreign 
capital, and introduce a market in land use 
rights. Shenzhen also prides itself on having 
become the fi rst Chinese city without villages 
when the last remaining villages in the outlying 
northern districts of Bao’an and Longgang were 
legally urbanized in 2004. Pine Mansion, where 
I started fi eldwork in the summer of 2011, was 
part of this last wave.1 It has become the small-
est administrative unit in the city, a community 
(shequ) run by a workstation under the juris-
diction of the subdistrict of Guanlan and the 
district of Bao’an. In this process of legal urban-
ization, the former villagers have lost their peas-
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ant hukou (residence permit) and have become 
urban citizens of Shenzhen.
In fact, urbanization had already started 
well before, in the 1980s and 1990s. Like other 
villages located in the urban-rural interface 
zones, Pine Mansion has become home to many 
low-income temporary migrants. Its population 
exploded from three thousand inhabitants at 
the end of the 1970s to almost sixty thousand in 
2010, and the migrant population, which holds 
only temporary residency in the village, sig-
nifi cantly outnumbers the estimated fourteen 
hundred original inhabitants (yuancunmin). 
Most of these native residents bear the surname 
Chen and form the Pine Mansion Chen lineage 
community.2
In theory, legal urbanization and the trans-
formation of the village into an urban commu-
nity entails the taking over of the land heretofore 
managed by the collective by the state. In many 
cases, the local government buys the land at low 
prices and sells the use rights at higher prices to 
real estate development companies. Elsewhere 
in China entire village communities have been 
deprived of their lands, leading at times to so-
cial protests such as the one that broke out in 
December 2011 in Wukan, a village in the south 
of Guangdong Province. What is specifi c about 
Shenzhen is that the former villages have gener-
ally retained land use rights on their collective 
lands. In Pine Mansion, the Shenzhen govern-
ment took over only a very small part, mainly 
the forest and hilly land that had been left  un-
used.3 To securitize these collective assets, a co-
operative shareholding system was introduced 
not only in Shenzhen, but elsewhere in Guang-
dong Province (Po 2012). Th e shareholding com-
panies (gufen hezuo gongsi) are now the major 
economic agents in urbanized villages; they man-
age the real estate assets of the former collectives. 
Only the native residents (yuancunmin) are en-
titled to hold a share in these companies.
Th e case of the former village of Pine Man-
sion, whose transformations are part and parcel 
of the making of the Shenzhen special economic 
zone, lends itself well to an examination of how 
the process of economic liberalization occurs 
and whether it can be ascribed to the infl uence 
of neoliberalism. Th e defi nition of neoliber-
alism has been heatedly debated over the past 
years in anthropology and other disciplines, and 
even more so in China, where its appropriate-
ness and applicability are put into question.
According to David Harvey, China meets 
the general characteristic of neoliberalization 
and its logic of “accumulation by dispossession” 
(2005: 153–155). Harvey represents an approach 
to neoliberalism that views it as an economic 
process backed by state power. He is, however, 
careful not to claim explicitly that the Chinese 
state has endorsed the neoliberal project. In his 
chapter on China, he uses a slightly diff erent 
line of argumentation, namely, that the reforms 
and their consequences have created the actual 
conditions necessary for the working of a neo-
liberal economy: “a large, easily exploited, and 
relatively powerless labor force” and the accu-
mulation of wealth in the hands of party leaders 
and government offi  cials turned businessmen. 
Th ese qualify China as a neoliberal economy, al-
beit “with Chinese characteristics” (ibid.: 144).
Another second strand of thought, the so-
called governmentality school, places more em-
phasis on the orderly eff ects of neoliberal gov-
ernance and on neoliberalism as a governing 
technology. It is represented by claims made by 
several anthropologists of China about the dom-
inance of neoliberalism in China (Anagnost 
2004; Pun 2003; Rofel 2007; Yan 2003). Frank 
Pieke (2012) locates the incursion of neoliberal-
ism in the recent emphasis of government rhet-
oric and action on “social management” (shehui 
guanli), which is partly borrowed from Western 
“new public management”. “Social management 
combines two seemingly incompatible elements: 
a neoliberal emphasis on the autonomy of the 
public sector borrowed from public management 
and a continued Leninist emphasis on the lead-
ing role of the Party and government” (ibid.: 
157).
In what follows I combine the two trends out-
lined above to look at neoliberalization as a pro-
cess (Peck and Tickell 2002) fueled by a blend 
of neoliberalism and other ideological strands 
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and ethical traditions to shape government pol-
icies and governing technologies aimed at ex-
panding capitalism. Th e conceptual reduction 
of neoliberalism to a technology of governance 
is not satisfactory, for two main reasons. First, as 
Andrew Kipnis has argued, the exclusive focus 
on Western contexts in the writings of Nikolas 
Rose (1996), from whom many of those who 
have written on neoliberal governmentality in 
China and other postsocialist settings draw their 
inspiration, is highly problematic in that it leads 
to confl ating features that he isolates to defi ne 
neoliberal governmentality—governing from 
a distance, calculability, and the promotion of 
self-activating, disciplined, and individuated 
subjects—with Western philosophies of gov-
ernance and policies. Yet, Kipnis points out, 
these defi ning features can be found in a vari-
ety of governing cultures; in the case of China, 
in the thought (among others) of Confucius, 
who linked self-cultivation to right government 
(2008: 283).
Th e problem is that by confi ning the analysis 
of neoliberalism to governmentality, the debate 
remains restricted to whether or not particular 
features of governance can be seen as constitut-
ing a specifi c Western form of neoliberalism, 
a “regime of truth” that becomes generalized 
as it is being diff used to the rest of the planet. 
Indeed, and this is my second point, when re-
duced to governmentality, little space remains 
for analyzing how the actual process of the neo-
liberalization of the economy takes place. Th e 
analysis of governing techniques should there-
fore be tied to the goals that are being pursued 
and the direction of the social world they are 
oriented toward (Smith 2011: 12). Capitalism as 
an economic system based on private property 
rights organizing relations between workers and 
owners of the means of production should be 
distinguished from neoliberalism, an ideopraxis 
that seeks to implement the conditions for capi-
talism’s eff ective working. Th erefore, neoliberal-
ization is largely state-driven in that it depends 
on the conditions that only the state is in a posi-
tion to implement: an ideological environment 
in which subjects play the game by conforming 
to their allocated function as self-governing en-
trepreneurs, and an institutional framework or 
rules of the game that allow the exercise of indi-
vidual entrepreneurial freedoms. Th e set of pol-
icies and governing technologies used to ensure 
these conditions are met drive toward the full 
expansion of capitalist logic and therefore the 
disembedding of the economic from the social.
Leong Liew (2005), Andrew Kipnis (2007, 
2008), Donald Nonini (2008) strongly criticize 
the tendency to envision neoliberalism as a dom-
inant ideology in China. Hence, it is important 
to examine, as Aihwa Ong has suggested, how 
neoliberalism encounters and is articulated with 
“other ethical regimes” in particular contexts 
(2006: 9)—even though in her chapter on Shen-
zhen she does not address them, nor specify 
what they might be. In this article I look at how 
neoliberalization is currently at work, but far 
from hegemonic. I show how neoliberal princi-
ples that have led to the formation of Shenzhen 
as a vanguard of capitalism in China are both 
combined with and countered by other ethical 
traditions, such as the moral economies of local 
communities that emphasize equity and collec-
tive solidarity among members of the same lin-
eage and village and assign importance to the 
proper care for ancestors. I interrogate the am-
bivalent relations between the particular Chi-
nese form of state-promoted neoliberalism and 
practices and values that may be at once con-
gruent and incongruent with each other. As I 
pointed out above, in the specifi c case of Shen-
zhen’s former villages, more than elsewhere in 
urbanizing China, the transition to market so-
cialism that has taken place until recently did not 
amount to an overall conversion of the economy 
to capitalism nor a renouncement of the invoca-
tion of socialist ideology. However, if we accept 
that the Chinese state is currently attempting to 
go beyond market socialism by further liberal-
izing an economy that is still largely governed 
by noncapitalist principles, then we should ask 
how, in the course of this process, it combines 
with and encounters other logics of action obey-
ing other ideologies and ethical regimes. Th ese 
are not necessarily in opposition to each other. 
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As John Gledhill (2004: 339) has pointed out, 
some aspects of neoliberal ideology and rheto-
rics may resonate with grassroots attitudes.
In the fi rst section, I start by pointing out 
these resonances by showing how the lineage is 
conceived of as an enterprise and is animated by 
an ethos of entrepreneurialism. Th is accounts 
for why the maintenance of the lineage in the 
transformation of the rural collectives has of-
fered fertile ground for the emergence of a local 
capitalist coalition, as much as the revival of the 
lineage can be seen as having been stimulated 
by the economic reforms. Yet, building on Da-
vid Faure’s work on lineage and capitalism in 
China, I show that the vision of the lineage as an 
enterprise does not match the capitalist business 
type. In retracing the recent history of the trans-
formation of Shenzhen’s peasant villages and 
the survival of the collective economy, growing 
discordance may be detected between the col-
lectivist values that fi gure centrally in lineage 
village community ethics and the valorization 
of the “public good” and the ideology of free 
enterprise and individual ownership that drives 
the transition toward capitalism. I demonstrate 
this point in the second section, with an exam-
ple of the current discourses in governmental 
spheres on the necessity of obliterating the re-
mains of the collective economy in Shenzhen’s 
former villages. We will see, moreover, that the 
lineage “ideo-logics” (Augé 1975) that rest on 
territorial roots and ancestor worship go against 
neoliberal spatial zoning—the creation of spaces 
where the logics of the market and of capitalism 
fully prevail—and the ongoing policy of pro-
hibiting religious practices seen as backward 
and superstitious by the Chinese party-state. In 
the last section, by taking as an illustration the 
way in which the villagers managed to save their 
founding ancestor’s grave site, I argue that this 
situation cannot be interpreted as a diametrical 
opposition between the Confucian ethical re-
gime of the lineage and the neoliberalism sup-
posedly endorsed by the state. It is, rather, a 
complex confi guration where the lineage vil-
lage community takes part in a local capitalist 
coalition and tries to maintain its autonomy in 
the face of state policies that are themselves a 
complex blend of state interventions in the econ-
omy, neoliberal governance, and Confucian 
principles.
Th e lineage village as an enterprise
In the old center of Pine Mansion stands the an-
cestral hall of the Chen lineage’s founding ances-
tor. Painted on wooden boards on both sides of 
the entrance door to the hall is a two-line verse 
(duilian) proclaiming, “Th e source rises in Chan-
gle, the enterprise starts in Bao’an.” Th is formula 
encapsulates the founding act of ancestor Zhen-
neng, who had migrated from Changle in north-
ern Guangdong Province to Bao’an, where he 
settled in the middle of the eighteenth century. 
He initiated the development of the Pine Man-
sion Chen lineage village, which became typical 
of “the lineage-village complex,” widespread in 
the Guangdong and Fujian Provinces of south-
ern China (Freedman 1958, 1966).
Since their “invention” (Faure 1989), lineages 
have been conceived of as a corporate enterprise, 
and they are still very much so today. Although 
as a cultural form the lineage had been prefi g-
ured by communities of worship sacrifi cing to 
common ancestors (Ebrey 1986), it is in the pe-
riod stretching from the sixteenth to the eigh-
teenth century that local groups registered their 
holdings for taxation purposes (Faure 1989). As 
an agrarian empire, the Chinese state generally 
followed a basic philosophy of expanding agri-
cultural production and distribution in order to 
create a steady source of revenues and a stable 
social order (Wong 1997: 98). Economic ex-
pansion came from opening up new land and 
improving productivity on already cultivated 
fi elds.4 It is in this very context that the lineage 
was created. Th e lineage served to legitimate 
settlement rights that included the right to build 
houses, to gather fuel on the hillsides, and to 
open up land for cultivation (Faure 1989: 6). For 
this reason genealogies, such as that of the Pine 
Mansion Chens, contain foundation legends in 
the guise of settlement accounts.
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Th e Pine Mansion Chen lineage is con-
ceived of as an enterprise in several ways. First, 
the foundational act of ancestor Zhenneng is 
depicted in the genealogy history as an entre-
preneurial act in the sense that he settled in a 
new place with his three sons, cleared the land, 
and domesticated a savage and hostile envi-
ronment, laying down the foundations for the 
prosperity of his descendants. Second, the lin-
eage in itself is a corporate entity that acts in 
the name of founding ancestor Zhenneng, with 
the goal of continuing his enterprise. Th is is, 
for instance, clearly stated in the fi rst pages of 
the Chen genealogy, where all the compilation 
committee members are portrayed. Underneath 
their photographs there are a few biographical 
lines that systematically detail their genera-
tional rank starting from Zhenneng, summarize 
their achievements, and end with the standard 
formulas “he is actively contributing to Zhen-
neng’s cause” (yigui rexin zhite zhenzu shiye) or 
“he works wholeheartedly for the public good” 
(rexin gongyi shiye). Th ese formulas, used inter-
changeably, show how the Chen lineage mem-
bers see themselves as forming a corporate body 
for which founding ancestor Zhenneng stands. 
Th e “enterprise” is here understood as being 
the lineage itself, and any action, fi nancial or in 
kind, performed for the welfare of its members 
is celebrated as a contribution to the “public 
good” (gongyi shiye), a continuation of Zhen-
neng’s initial undertaking.
Th ird, the Chen villagers collectively own 
several enterprises as shareholders. In the early 
1980s, when the reforms opening up the econ-
omy were launched, each of Pine Mansion’s 
three agricultural production teams (shengchan-
dui) became “cooperative companies for eco-
nomic development” ( jingjifazhan hezuoshe). 
Th e Chen villagers called on their kin from 
Hong Kong and the diaspora to build factories 
on the lands they stopped cultivating by the 
early 1990s. Moreover, they also individually 
used the privately owned plots of land (ziliudi) 
they were allocated when the household re-
sponsibility system, allowing them to grow their 
own crops, was introduced, to build apartment 
buildings that they rented out to migrants who 
came in by the thousands. In many cases they 
used the capital they had accumulated overseas 
or in Hong Kong or money sent from abroad or 
downtown Shenzhen by their kin. Th is is by no 
means a process particular to Pine Mansion; it 
has occurred all over Shenzhen.
Along with the transformation of their legal 
status from rural (“peasant”) to urban (“non-
peasant”) residents in 2004, the three “cooper-
ative companies for economic development” 
were turned into seven small and one large 
cooperative joint-stock companies. Th e seven 
small companies are associated with three “res-
idents’ committees” that roughly correspond to 
pre-Mao territorial portions held by the Chen 
lineage’s three main segments (stemming from 
founding ancestor Zhenneng’s three sons). Th ey 
manage real estate on land that was cultivated 
by each of the seven cultivation groups of the 
Mao era and correspond to pre-Mao lineage 
subsegments (stemming from later ancestors). 
Th e larger company operates at the scale of the 
entire former lineage village and corresponds to 
the former Maoist production brigade (sheng-
chan dadui).
Th e territorial and social structure that under-
lies these collectives-turned-companies has thus 
remained largely the same over time. Moreover, 
the composition of the former village leader-
ship is almost all Chen: the heads of the village 
committees, now urban residents’ committees 
( juweihui), and the heads of the shareholding 
companies are all Chens. Th ere is one notable 
exception: the local Communist Party branch 
leader, who is also the head of the workstation, 
is a Huang. Nevertheless, he belongs to the mi-
nority of native families that bear other sur-
names than Chen, and being born and raised in 
the village, he participates in the dense intravil-
lage network of ties that the predominance of the 
Chen lineage lends to the former village com-
munity (all children brought up in the village 
went to the elementary and middle schools that 
had been established by the Chen lineage). Vil-
lages with active temple associations or strong 
lineage organizations are more likely to avoid 
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or resist cadres’ rapacious practices and to im-
plement community projects. When social net-
works exist that “incorporate both village of-
fi cials and citizens, they restrict predatory be-
havior and facilitate public projects that might 
not otherwise become a reality” (Tsai 2002: 26). 
Th is is the case in the Pine Mansion community.
Th e village leaders manage the collective real 
estate assets in the name of the “public good”. 
Th e head of one of the shareholding companies 
in Pine Mansion defi ned them as real estate 
companies. Th is is how he summarized their 
activity: “We receive factory rent every month 
and we do the maintenance (of factory build-
ings).” Large factory buildings and dormitories 
are rented out to mainly American and Taiwan-
ese companies; smaller factories and shops and 
restaurants are rented out to migrants from in-
ner China. In addition to the individual income 
drawn from the rental of apartments to mi-
grants, the Pine Mansion shareholders receive 
annual dividends, as well as health insurance 
and pensions (for men over sixty and women 
over fi ft y) from the companies.
Th e lineage village organization thus set the 
conditions for what Smart and Lin (2007) term 
“local capitalism,” capitalist practices that are 
made possible not so much by the social and 
legal infrastructure of the nation-state but by 
local conditions of existence that may vary con-
siderably from one place to another. “Kinship 
or social networks provide non-market frame-
works within which the locality engages in 
external market transactions to accumulate col-
lective capital” (ibid.: 285). What has emerged 
is thus a local capitalist coalition that links local 
residents, local offi  cials, and translocal kin. It is 
supported by the lineage “ideo-logic” of broth-
erhood that stretches the claims of shared local 
belonging across national borders—a logic of 
inclusion. Only the original villagers (yuancun-
min) can be shareholders. Only they receive an-
nual dividends derived from the management 
of the real estate, as well as the welfare benefi ts 
distributed by the shareholding companies.
In contrast, the migrants from China’s inner 
provinces that reside temporarily in the village 
and do not hold local hukou are excluded from 
the shareholding companies. Th e district of 
Bao’an is an area with one of the highest con-
centrations of immigrant population, standing 
at approximately 93 percent of the total popu-
lation (Li 2006), which is even higher than in 
Shenzhen as a whole (approximately 75 per-
cent). Th e ratio of migrants is even higher in 
Pine Mansion. According to the offi  cial census 
of August 2010, there were 59,980 residents in 
Pine Mansion. Interestingly, the local census 
divides this population into three broad cate-
gories: those under the jurisdiction of the three 
main resident committees (46,658 individu-
als); the factory workers living in dormitories 
(11,881); and the original villagers (yuancun-
min) (1,441). Th is suggests a new distinction 
other than the rural-urban divide that has been 
much commented upon in contemporary Chi-
nese studies; namely, a separation between the 
immigrant population that usually holds a tem-
porary residence permit in the village, and the 
village natives, the yuancunmin, who fi nd them-
selves landlords to migrants who are not neces-
sarily rural and poor.
Th e continuation of the lineage structure that 
lies behind the division between natives and mi-
grants may be regarded as serving to participate 
in the maintenance of a labor reserve, a readily 
usable workforce deprived of basic rights that 
Harvey identifi es as being central to the logic of 
“accumulation by dispossession.” It is central to 
the process by which the Chinese economy is 
undergoing neoliberalization (2005: 153–155). 
However, it is at odds with the theory of neolib-
eralism in itself, with its emphasis on individual 
rights and an open and competitive economic 
environment.
Th e moral economy of the collectives 
and neoliberal reforms in the making
Th e existence of such remnants of former ru-
ral collectives is being questioned in govern-
ment spheres. A tool in the transition toward 
market socialism, the offi  cial term for them is 
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cooperative shareholding companies (gufen he-
zuo gongsi).5 Shareholding companies are gov-
erned by local (municipal and district) rules 
and regulations, not national legislation (Gu 
2010: 27).6 Th ey are independent legal entities, 
and government cannot interfere in their man-
agement. Moreover, they have a hybrid charac-
ter. Th e cooperative joint-stock company is not 
offi  cially categorized as a form of business in 
company law in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), which has two categories of enterprises, 
joint-stock companies and limited liability com-
panies. Th e cooperative joint-stock company dif-
fers from these business types in that it aims to 
promote cooperation among farmers or work-
ers and does not distinguish between owners of 
the capital and employees. Moreover, the share-
holders have limited rights to transfer their 
shares to outsiders. Yet it also diff ers from the 
Mao-era commune in that it is oriented toward 
profi t making and embraces market principles.
Th e very fact that shareholding companies 
were designed as a means to build a socialist 
market economy and are therefore not included 
in company law now seems to be a problem, and 
there are signs of an impending change in the 
regulations governing shareholding companies. 
Th is is probably due to the defi citary situation 
of many companies. In Pine Mansion, as could 
be seen from the bulletin boards that stand 
outside on the street in front of the companies’ 
offi  ce buildings, they were all in defi cit except 
the largest one.7 One of the smaller companies 
published the following fi nancial statement for 
March 2012: its revenues (mainly from the rental 
of factory buildings) for the month amounted to 
180,600 yuan, and its expenses (mainly welfare) 
to 328,100 yuan. Th e Pine Mansion small com-
panies are no exception in this area of northern 
Shenzhen. In 2011 90 percent of the 108 gufen-
gongsi (11 large and 97 smaller ones) in the 
subdistrict of Guanlan, where Pine Mansion is 
located, were in defi cit. Th e offi  cer at the Guan-
lan collective property offi  ce (which supervises 
the shareholding companies and helps to solve 
confl icts among shareholders) gave several rea-
sons for this trend, the major one being that the 
distribution of dividends occurs independently 
of the companies’ profi ts. According to her, this 
is because the heads of the shareholding compa-
nies are elected by the villagers and are therefore 
not motivated to reduce dividends in case of a 
decrease in income.8
A “draft  notifi cation of opinions on the re-
form of gufengongsi rules and regulations” was 
posted in November 2010 on the Shenzhen gov-
ernment website, which seems to have triggered 
the city’s district governments to investigate the 
state of aff airs and consider the possibilities of 
reform.9 A Bao’an district government report 
encapsulates the government and administra-
tive outlook.10 Th e opening statement starts 
with a positive appraisal, stating that the compa-
nies “have been an important way of promoting 
the development of the Shenzhen local [bendi] 
economy.” However, the text continues, they 
have several major shortcomings: they are not 
purely economic, since they are not a “company 
law” type of company; they have an “interper-
sonal” (renhexing) and “hermetic” ( fengbixing) 
character, since “the distribution of shares has 
been eff ected according to strict rules of geo-
graphical proximity and blood ties”; and the 
shares are not mobile, as they cannot be trans-
ferred to outsiders, but may be transferred and 
inherited only among the yuancunmin. Th ere-
fore, the author suggests that the geographical 
limitations to ownership should give way to a 
system of business property rights (chanquan) 
that would grant the right for shares to be dis-
posed of freely.
It thus appears from these documents that 
government offi  cials are contemplating a change 
in regulations in order to put a defi nitive end to 
the remains of the rural collective economy that 
has been based, in Shenzhen’s former villages, 
on territorial and kinship ties. Th e cooperative 
shareholding companies have been a useful tool 
in the transition to a market economy and are 
a way to prevent the social unrest that may re-
sult from the infl ux of cheap labor by granting 
the former villagers a stable source of income. 
Th e reform that is being envisaged amounts to 
creating an institutional framework that would 
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ensure full capitalist logics, that is, a system of 
individual ownership of shares, and a manage-
ment oriented toward profi t.
Th is possible reform is framed by the larger 
civilizing discourse that prevails in China and 
that places the former villages at the opposite 
pole to modernity, as backward vestiges of a by-
gone area. Th e particularist ties of kinship and 
geographical proximity that prevailed in the for-
mation of the shareholding companies are now 
considered to be an impediment to the devel-
opment of a purely economic logic and a man-
agerial rationality. Ultimately, it is the lineage, 
a social organization considered inadequate to 
fulfi lling a role in a market economy oriented 
to profi t, that is being targeted, as shown in the 
last sentences of the district government report 
quoted previously:
In the traditional management of share-
holding companies, lineage relations 
[zongfa guanxi], a clannish ideology, 
and kinship ties hold together the share-
holding companies, and the enterprises’ 
development is conservative [baoshou]. 
In order to realize the sustainable devel-
opment of shareholding companies, it is 
necessary to establish incentive mecha-
nisms that will bring into play a higher 
order of management and a spirit of en-
deavor “want to do, dare to do, be quick to 
do” (xiang gan, gan gan, kuai gan).
It seems reasonably arguable that this statement 
is at least a partial fragment of neoliberal ide-
ology and technology of governance. It makes 
a discursive contrast between the conservatism 
of kinship ties and the modernity of entrepre-
neurial managerialism, and argues in favor of 
an economic system based on individuals rather 
than embedded in kinship ties. It announces the 
future adoption of more rational methods of 
management based on “incentive mechanisms” 
that, although their exact nature is not specifi ed, 
can be characterized as “technologies of subjec-
tivity” (Ong 2006: 6). Th ese include the acqui-
sition of skills, development of entrepreneurial 
ventures, and other techniques of self-engineer-
ing and capital accumulation.
Th e traditionalism, conservatism, and back-
wardness of lineage ties are seen as running 
against Shenzhen’s road toward modernity. Yet 
although the lineage is easy to blame, there is 
more than the prevalence of the lineage that is at 
stake here. If the lineage structure of the village 
economy has endured in spite of the advent of 
communism, it has not remained unchanged. 
Th e large lineages of southern China such as the 
one in Pine Mansion (whose size is considerably 
larger than that of other similar lineages in the 
area) were segmented and socially stratifi ed en-
tities. Th e land reform of the early 1950s broke 
down this system by equalizing land tenure. 
Th us, although the overall corporate structure 
has remained the same, land from then onward 
belonged to the village commune and not just the 
lineage, and internal segmentation was erased.
Th e social organization and egalitarian spirit 
of the commune is still very much present to-
day. Th is is shown in the manner in which the 
shares were distributed among the native villag-
ers when the shareholding companies were es-
tablished on 1 April 2004, according to a system 
of “fund-raising” (muji) or, more exactly, sub-
scription of a share. Th e principle of distribu-
tion of shares followed an egalitarian logic—one 
share per native villager born before the estab-
lishment of the company. Spouses who married 
into the lineage and hold hukou elsewhere were 
excluded (they oft en detain a share in their na-
tive village). It also operated with an equalizing 
logic: the amount of the sum to be paid for a 
share was calculated according to seniority and 
duration of residence in the village (older peo-
ple and individuals who had never left  the vil-
lage and who had spent their lifetime cultivating 
the land paid much less than younger people or 
those who had at one point left  the village to 
work for a wage).11 Th is system thus partly com-
pensates for the inequalities that had emerged 
in the 1980s and 1990s between those who had 
the means to build apartment buildings to rent 
and those who did not. Th ese are due to the 
randomness of the redistribution of individual 
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plots and of whether rights holders could obtain 
fi nancial support from relatives in Hong Kong 
or abroad. In this context, the former lineage 
village community persists in the shape of the 
shareholding company system and upholds the 
values of equality and social justice inherited 
from the Maoist era.12
Although the purpose of my research is not 
to trace the genealogy of these policy reforms, 
it is arguable that the necessity of obliterating 
the remains of the collective economy in Shen-
zhen’s former villages as currently emphasized 
in governmental discourse constitutes a step to-
ward the further liberalization of the economy 
beyond market socialism. If, as we saw in the 
fi rst section, the lineage was a crucial tool in 
the form of economic expansion chosen by the 
Chinese imperial state, this is due, according to 
Roy Bin Wong, to the fact that in the absence 
of the interstate competition that characterized 
Europe, it had “no incentive to promote any sort 
of capitalism” (1997: 147). David Faure holds a 
similar view but argues more specifi cally that 
Chinese businesses were modeled on the type 
of social relationships that prevail in lineage 
organizations (2006: 36–37). Th erefore, ritual 
and patronage had a strong place in Chinese 
business institutions. Until Western law came to 
be applied, China did not have any law to deal 
with a business company. Faure states that “it 
has taken China all of the twentieth century to 
make the transformation and to this day, it is far 
from complete” (ibid.: 3). We see here that this 
is indeed what is at stake today in the transfor-
mation of the former collectives and the conver-
sion from cooperative shareholding companies 
into full-fl edged capitalist enterprises.
Th e stigmatization of “clannish ties” and the 
lineage village organization as embedded in kin-
ship and territorial relations here clearly serves 
a purpose of economic neoliberalization. Th is 
is a departure from the Maoist era’s condem-
nation of the lineage as a “feudal” and unegal-
itarian formation of imperial times. Th is shift  
in discourse could further be explained by the 
fact that as the lineage has changed under sev-
eral decades of Maoism, it now stands for what a 
regime that still labels itself socialist would have 
more diffi  culty to criticize overtly: the uphold-
ing by its members of collectivist, egalitarian, 
and redistributive values, in the name of a “pub-
lic good”, a principle of which the state claims 
the monopoly. As we will see in the next sec-
tion, the way in which elements of state social-
ism’s fi ght against remnants of prerevolutionary 
times are woven into the new discourse, namely, 
the attack on beliefs and practices deemed “su-
perstitious” and “backward”, may contribute to 
conceal this shift .
Remembering the source: Confucian 
neoliberalism and popular religion
Lineage organizations, considered characteris-
tic of feudal social formations, were made illegal 
at the advent of the communist regime and to-
day they are still illegal, or at least unrecognized 
entities. Since the beginning of the reform era, 
they are, however, tolerated, in the various more 
acceptable institutional forms they may take.
Since the reopening, the Pine Mansion Chens 
have been active in restoring the lineage cultural 
activities that had been prohibited under Mao. 
Worship at the hall and the tomb was resumed 
as early as 1981, and the altar in the ancestral 
hall was repaired and the tomb recemented. 
More recently, at the end of the 1990s, the Chens 
built a monumental mausoleum around the 
tomb of founding ancestor Zhenneng. All these 
activities have been carried out with the fi nan-
cial contributions of Pine Mansion Chens in 
Hong Kong and overseas relatives from places 
such as Canada, Surinam, Belgium, and French 
Polynesia.
Th e case of the mausoleum is particularly 
interesting with respect to the relation between 
the lineage and the state. Th e Chen villagers 
decided to build this mausoleum following the 
funeral reforms (binzang gaige) that were imple-
mented in Shenzhen in 1997 as a result of the 
national regulations ordered by the state coun-
cil. Th e funeral reform is not a novelty. Since it 
took power in 1949 the ruling party has tried 
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to reform funeral customs, and it was during 
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Rev-
olution that the most comprehensive measures 
toward this end were taken. Th e main result was 
the drawing of a dividing line between urban 
and rural customs (Whyte 1988). Cremation 
of the dead has become the norm in the cities, 
whereas in the rural areas eff orts were directed 
toward clearing tombs located on arable lands. 
Nowadays the reform is spreading in the coun-
tryside, leading at times to protest movements. 
Considering the resistance these policies meet, 
authorities are generally careful to legitimize 
their implementation by the need to make space 
for roads and other infrastructure. Th e rapid 
urbanization of Shenzhen’s former rural villages 
explains the dramatic way in which the national 
reform was applied there at the end of the 1990s. 
A decision was made to reach a rate of 100 per-
cent cremations in a very short time. Moreover, 
the authorities ordered that all buried remains 
be disinterred and cremated and the ashes spread 
out or stored in a publicly accredited cemetery. 
In Pine Mansion, a government team came 
down during the year 1998 to proceed with the 
exhumation. Th e villagers were threatened with 
being stripped of their shares in their compa-
nies if they did not comply.
Th is reform was justifi ed in the name of build-
ing a “socialist spiritual civilization.” Its stated 
goal was “to eliminate superstitious activities 
[mixin huodong] in funeral customs.”13 It goes 
against long-standing burial practices that are 
guided by the goal of transforming the dead 
into proper ancestors and avoiding their be-
coming evildoing and revengeful spirits (Ahern 
1971: 125; Baptandier 2001: 15). If ancestors are 
properly cared for and receive regular ritual at-
tention, they are expected to be benevolent to 
their descendants. It is therefore important to 
bury a dead relative in a propitious site whose 
geomancy ( fengshui) will canalize the vital 
energy (qi) that is contained in the bones and 
is a source of vitality and fertility to their de-
scendants (Bruun 2003; Feuchtwang 1974; Pa-
ton 2007). Th e grave sites and remains of the 
ancestors are therefore of utmost importance; 
destroying the sites amounts to putting an end 
to the benefi ts of fengshui and destroying the 
lineage as a whole.
Th e funeral reform aims at suppressing these 
ancient and powerful spaces and replacing them 
with abstract modern ones. Mayfair Yang sees 
in this reform the continuation of an imported 
Western colonialist discourse decreeing the 
character of modern civilization as one defi ned 
by science (2004: 732). However, the critique 
of “superstitious” funeral customs by orthodox 
Confucians has a long tradition in China. Th is 
trend promoting secular mores and rational 
thought is more than a Western import. Th e 
idea that individuals owe their destiny to benefi -
cial geomancy rather than their own endeavors 
has long been criticized by the Confucians (C. K. 
Yang 1957: 276) and taken over by Communist 
Party–promoted state atheism. Th e funeral re-
form expresses an amalgamation of the ideals of 
economic effi  ciency and modernity, and the val-
ues of rationality and loyalty to the state rather 
than to the lineage.
Th is does not mean that the Confucian-
inspired and state-driven funeral reform is op-
posed to the respect and remembrance of de-
ceased family members. Filial piety (xiao) lies at 
the very heart of the Confucian doctrine. What is 
implied here is a particular strand of Confucian 
thought that opposes the corporeal and material 
dimension of ancestor worship—the continued 
presence of the ancestors and infl uence on their 
descendants through the medium of their bones 
infused with the soil of their grave site—which 
should be replaced by spiritual commemora-
tion and symbolic gestures (C. K. Yang 1961: 
44). Ancestral halls, for this reason, are toler-
ated in reform-era China. Where the ideology 
that drives the funeral reform comes very close 
to neoliberalism, as described by the tenets of 
the governmentality school of neoliberalism, 
is when it promotes a rational and individually 
rooted way of remembering the ancestors that is 
more compatible with economic effi  ciency than 
the worship of ancestors at their tombs.
One of the villagers, a manager of the large 
shareholding company, explained how the Pine 
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Mansion Chens reacted to the funeral reform: 
“During this burial reform, we thought of our 
ancestor Zhenneng, the founding ancestor 
of our lineage, the one who settled here and 
founded Pine Mansion … [and] we thought that 
we must protect our ancestor’s bones. We must 
not let people excavate him. We will not allow 
such a thing.” He further explains—as several 
other Chens did—that they wanted to avoid at 
any cost the dispersal of the ashes of the Chen 
ancestors (their placing in a public cemetery 
outside the former village). Th e mausoleum was 
a very clever solution to a double challenge: how 
to protect at least the founding collective ances-
tor’s remains and where to store the remains of 
the ancestors they could not avoid exhuming 
and burning to ashes. Th e mausoleum was built 
around Zhenneng’s tomb, and the aisles of the 
building off er storage space for the ashes of all 
Zhenneng’s descendants as well as that of some 
other (non-Chen) ancestors of the villagers. 
Th e entrance that faces the tomb is framed by 
the same duilian as in the ancestral hall: “Th e 
source rises in Changle, the enterprise starts in 
Bao’an.”
To summarize the process, it was the return 
to Pine Mansion, in the course of the year 1997, 
of a high-level government cadre who had just 
retired from his position as the vice president of 
the Shenzhen airport that triggered the collec-
tive mobilization to build the mausoleum. Gan-
wan had returned to his village to help a cousin 
residing overseas in Belgium, who wanted to use 
his fortune to help his fellow villagers by build-
ing an older people’s activities hall. Th e mauso-
leum was built thanks to Ganwan’s connections 
in government, the construction industry, and 
among the overseas Chens. With the help of 
overseas contributions, the villagers built the 
mausoleum around Zhenneng’s tomb; aft er the 
building was completed, Ganwan applied for 
heritage status, which he obtained in return for 
a few banquets and bribes and thanks to his con-
nections in the Shenzhen city administration. 
Ganwan, himself a member of the Communist 
Party, told me that “because the communists’ 
policy is changing all the time, we never know 
what they are up to. … What we wanted was to 
protect Zhenneng’s tomb forever.” What was at 
stake was the permanency of the lineage in the 
face of changing policies.
Such a collective act is, of course, at odds 
with the state-driven policy of economic neo-
liberalization. Th e protection of the founding 
ancestor’s tomb and the way the Chen villagers 
have succeeded in exempting this piece of land 
from any future appropriation by the state for 
economic development demonstrates that, to 
a certain extent, the logic of lineage as an en-
terprise is one in which the preservation of the 
lineage itself is its own end. To protect the tomb 
is also to preserve the lineage’s history against 
the tendency in Shenzhen to erase traces of 
the past and replace “uncivilized” villages with 
modern urban compounds. Th is discrepancy 
between state-planned economic and urban 
development and lineage village continuation is 
not oppositional. Th e Chen genealogy stresses 
the future development of the lineage as an en-
terprise and the prosperity of its members as a 
desirable goal. Yet this goal and the means to 
achieve it diff er from the governmental vision 
of Shenzhen’s future, in so far as, in the Chens’ 
eyes, it is the perpetuation of the lineage that is 
at stake. Not only can economic success not be 
achieved without properly and ritually acknowl-
edging its origins, the lineage itself would disap-
pear without a territorial anchorage. It is on this 
precise point that the state-promoted enterprise 
of neoliberalization that drives the making of 
the Shenzhen special economic zone, the fi rst 
Chinese city without villages to be inhabited 
by modern, entrepreneurial citizens disembed-
ded from particularistic ties and detached from 
any “backward” beliefs, diff ers from the lineage 
enterprise, aimed at perpetuating the estate cre-
ated in the past and the lineage village entity as 
a cause in itself.
Conclusion
Th e duilian that frames the entrance to the Chen 
lineage hall and the mausoleum in Pine Man-
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sion appears, through its celebration of the 
foundational act and entrepreneurial venture 
of ancestor Zhenneng, as a historical anteced-
ent and local prefi guration of the processes that 
are occurring today on a large scale in Shenzhen 
and elsewhere in China. However, the rationale 
for the perpetuation of the lineage as an “enter-
prise” that the formula encapsulates is far from 
congruent with neoliberal theory and practice. 
Th e transformation of this local group of for-
mer peasants—the original Chen villagers—
into a category of native landlords benefi ting 
from their monopoly of rentals to some extent 
conforms to the process of neoliberalization, 
relying as it does on the presence of a readily us-
able workforce and capital accumulation in the 
hands of a few. Yet the ideology and politics of 
lineage maintenance are at odds with the neo-
liberal theory of open economic competition. 
Th ey are also incongruent with the aims of eco-
nomic development pursued by the state and 
city government that require the urbanization 
of villages and push toward the abolition of the 
former collectives and the end of “superstitious” 
religious practices.
Th e grassroots conception of the lineage as 
an enterprise points to the factors that may ex-
plain why the transition to a market economy 
in the special economic zone has been such a 
success. Yet this transition has also to be based 
on mechanisms designed to protect the local 
people from increased job competition and to 
guarantee their livelihoods in the context of ur-
banization and the shift  from agriculture to in-
dustry. Th e transition toward market socialism 
in the special economic zone has partly rested 
on noncapitalist principles that have profi ted 
the former villagers and generated a category 
of native landlords. It is much less certain that 
neoliberalization, in the sense of the total dis-
embedding of economic practices from social 
relations, as is being considered, delinking share-
holding companies from kinship and territorial 
ties, will prove to be as successful.
It is hard to agree with Harvey that neoliberal-
ism has become the dominant way in which peo-
ple everywhere make sense of their lives (2005: 
3). My point is that, if the neoliberal shaping of 
the special economic zone has had such success, 
this has to do with the way in which it encoun-
tered, in this particular region, long-standing 
economic practices and the conception of the 
lineage as an enterprise, dating back, as David 
Faure has shown, from at least the seventeenth 
century. Th ese practices and regimes of value 
may, however, if their embeddedness in kin and 
territorial relationships is threatened, come into 
friction with the neoliberal spirit, mixed with 
a kind of secular Confucianism that animates 
Chinese state policies today.
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Notes
 1. I have stayed in Pine Mansion four times (July–
August 2011, July 2012, March 2013, and Oc-
tober 2013) to carry out fi eldwork as part of a 
research project on the connections linking 
this long-standing emigrant village with its 
diaspora.
 2. Lineages are descent groups whose members 
are patrilineally related and claim a common 
ancestry (Ebrey and Watson 1986: 6). Many 
villages in the area are single or multi-lineage 
communities.
 3. Th e amount of land retained depends both on 
the villages’ capacity of negotiation and the gov-
ernment willingness to pay for compensation. 
Li and Smart (2013) document a case in which 
villagers did not want to become urban so they 
could continue to draw fi nancial benefi ts from 
their land and other rural benefi ts.
 4. Recent studies in global history by Andre Gun-
der Frank (1998), Kenneth Pomeranz (2000), 
Roy Bin Wong (1997), and Giovanni Arrighi 
(2007) agree on one fact: China was a major 
economic power, if not the fi rst, until the fi rst 
decades of the nineteenth century. Wong turns 
to the dynamics of state making and the moti-
vations behind the Chinese and European po-
litical economies to explain the divergence that 
occurred.
 5. According to legal scholar Gu Minkang (1999), 
the shareholding system introduced in China in 
1985 was borrowed from the West, and its main 
motivation was to change the operating mecha-
nisms of state-owned enterprises.
 6. In Shenzhen they are ruled by the Shenzhen 
special economic zone regulations on coopera-
tive joint-stock companies (Shenzhen jingjiqu 
gufenhezuogongsi tiaoli) of 1994, modifi ed in 
1997).
 7. Th ere are several reasons for this: the larger 
one is narrowly controlled by the subdistrict of 
Guanlan, its director and vice director are the 
Pine Mansion party secretary and community 
head, and it has easier access to bank loans and 
subsidies to invest in the modernization of fac-
tory buildings and new factories or other real 
estate.
 8. Interview with an employee of the collective 
property offi  ce (Jitizichan bangongshi) at the 
Guanlan offi  ce bureau, July 2012.
 9. Draft  notifi cation of opinion on the reform of 
gufengongsi rules and regulations, Shenzhen city 
government, November 2010. It is referred to in 
the document cited in the next quote.
10. Opinion on the sustainable development of 
gufengongsi, 17 January 2012, by Wang Jun. 
http://www.bajj.gov.cn/gcsk/lltt/201201/t2012
0117_473573.htm (accessed 3 April 2013).
11. Locally born villagers who had temporarily re-
sided elsewhere retained their entitlement if they 
had not taken up urban hukou status before 
2004.
12. Th ese collective and redistributive ethics also 
animate the functioning of the lineage as a com-
munity of worship. On these matters it is the 
Chen lineage Zhenneng Foundation, an unre-
gistered civic organization, that takes on the 
main role. Because of lack of space I can only 
briefl y mention that its income pays for lineage 
activities: the two annual worship ceremonies 
and sacrifi ces, followed by the collective meal in 
which the entire lineage village community par-
ticipates, the activities hall for elderly people, 
and the maintenance of the two worship sites—
the ancestral temple and the mausoleum. Th e 
shareholding companies, however, also make 
contributions.
13. Bill no. 63, dated 3 March 1997. http://www
.szgm.gov.cn/publish/main/1/9/12/15/201211
01110740875740296/index.html (accessed 14 
October 2013).
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